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Abstract
Imperfect information has played a prominent role in modern business cycle theory. We
assess its importance by estimating the New Keynesian (NK) model under alternative infor-
mational assumptions. One version focuses on confusion between temporary and persistent
disturbances. Another, on unobserved variation in the ination target of the central bank. A
third on persistent mis{perceptions of the state of the economy (measurement error). And a
fourth assumes perfect information (the standard NK{DSGE version). We nd that imper-
fect information contains considerable explanatory power for business uctuations. Signal
extraction seems to provide a conceptually satisfactory, empirically plausible and quantita-
tively important business cycle mechanism.
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1Introduction
The role of imperfect information in business uctuations has been a prominent theme in mod-
ern business cycle theory. In the monetary, rational expectations model of Lucas, 1972, mis-
perceptions of nominal aggregates give rise to confusion between nominal and relative price
movements and constitute the main source of economic uctuations.1 Confusion about the
shocks aicting the economy is also present in the original version of the RBC model (Kydland
and Prescott, 1982). In this model, the confusion arises from the agents' inability to distinguish
between temporary and permanent changes in multi-factor productivity.
In spite of its presence in two of the most inuential modern macroeconomic models, imperfect
information is not considered an important element for understanding business cycles. There is a
presumption that imperfect knowledge of the true values of nominal aggregates is not important
enough to generate large and persistent movements in real economic activity. And the success
of the Kydland-Prescott RBC model in accounting for business cycle owes little, if anything, to
informational problems.
Recent work, however, has questioned the unimportance of imperfect information/signal extrac-
tion problems in inuencing macroeconomic outcomes. For instance, Orphanides (2002, 2003)
has forcefully argued that mis{perceptions of potential output may have played the key role be-
hind the excessively loose monetary policy and the great ination of the 70s. Collard and Dellas,
2007, claim that the failure of the rational expectations literature to nd signicant eects of
mis-perceived money may be due to its use of inappropriate measures of mis{perceptions. In
particular, using the proper measure leads to the uncovering of signicant eects on economic
activity. Moreover, they demonstrate that under {empirically plausible levels of{ imperfect in-
formation the NK model can deliver considerable inertia. Collard and Dellas, 2006, argue that
the success of imperfect information in accounting for business cycles is not limited to models
with sticky prices. In particular, confusion regarding the types of shocks aicting the economy
plays a crucial role in allowing also the RBC model to t a number of conditional, dynamic,
stylized facts. Finally, Woodford, 2003, and Lorenzoni, 2006, show that a Phelps-Lucas island
type of economy with strategic complementarities, idiosyncratic shocks and noisy aggregate
money supply (in the former) or productivity (in the latter), can exhibit realistic business cycle
patterns if the amount of noise is suciently high. In a similar vein, Angeletos and La'o, 2009,
argue that incomplete information can be useful for understanding business-cycles.
Why should one expect that imperfect information about the shocks and the true state of the
economy could play an important role in business cycles? The reason is to be found in the
response of the agents to perceived shocks. First, the agents may over{react to some shocks
1Such mis-perceptions may arise either from the complete unavailability of up-to-date information. Or, from
the fact that the available information is contaminated by measurement error (King, 1982)
2and this generates \excessive" volatility.2 And second, they under-react to some other shocks.
In particular, the reaction to a particular shock may be initially mooted as the agents attribute
part of the shock to other disturbances. And it may pick up gradually as the agents learn and
update their perceptions of the actual shocks that haver occurred. Imperfect information may
thus provide an endogenous propagation mechanism that can generate inertia, persistence and
reversals, and it can often lead to hump shaped dynamics (see, for instance, Dellas, 2006).
The objective of this paper is to undertake a comprehensive study of the role of imperfect
information in macroeconomic uctuations. Comprehensive in the sense that alternative infor-
mational setups are considered. And that the alternative versions of imperfect information are
compared not only among themselves but also to versions that assume perfect information.
Of the latter class of models we consider the two most widely used ones. Namely, the purely
forward looking version of the NK model (Woodford, 2002). And its popular \hybrid" version
with both forward and backward looking elements as well as real rigidities (Christiano et al,
2005, Gal  and Gertler, 1999, Smets and Wouters, 2003). Of the class of models with imperfect
information we consider three versions, each one relying on common, imperfect information but
emphasizing a dierent source of mis{perception. The rst one is motivated by Kydland and
Prescott, 1982, and Orphanides, 2002, and involves confusion between temporary and permanent
shocks. The second is motivated by Cogley and Sbordone, 2006, and relies on {unobserved{
variation in the ination target of the central bank. These two versions share in common the
assumption that the agents observe perfectly all endogenous variables (ination, output, interest
rate) but not all of the shocks. The third and nal version draws on Collard and Dellas', 2007,
argument that, as revealed by the process of data revisions, very few aggregate variables are
observed accurately. Consequently, unlike the two versions presented above, it assumes that the
shocks as well as some of the endogenous variables are observed with noise.3 This version thus
represents a more severe case of information imperfection than the other two. Nevertheless, as
we will establish later, the degree of mis{perception required by the model in order to t the
data is well within the range observed in the real world.
The models are estimated on US quarterly data over the 1966{2002 period using Bayesian
methods. They are then evaluated and compared in terms of various criteria: Overall t (the
log-likelihood), unconditional second moments, and IRFs.4
2For instance, they respond to changes in monetary aggregates while such changes would have been otherwise
neutral.
3While our story emphasizes measurement error in aggregate variables, rational inattention  a la Sims, 2003,
might also generate similar mis{perceptions. The implications of the latter have not been investigated economet-
rically yet.
4These comparisons constitute one of the main dierences between this paper and other work in the literature
that tests the empirical validity of the perfect information NK model under alternative specications. For instance,
Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004, nd that an estimated version of the NK model with backward indexation is
consistent with the data (as judged by the J{statistic in the context of GMM estimation). De Walque, Smets
and Wouters, 2004, nd that the Smets and Wouters model performs well even when the parameter of backward
3The main nding is that imperfect information has considerable explanatory power for the US
business cycle. In particular, it improves the t of the baseline NK model (that is, the forward
looking model without real rigidities) according to the log-likelihood criterion. Moreover, a
model that exhibits a more \severe" informational problem (the Collard and Dellas version) fares
better with regard to not only the NK model but also the "hybrid" model (the one with perfect
information, backward indexation and real rigidities) in spite of the fact that it does not itself
contain any real rigidities. This is an important result as backward indexation and real rigidities
have been the subjects of controversy and there is ongoing search in the profession to develop
models that share its success but rely less {at least quantitatively { on these features. Moreover,
we nd that the success of the imperfect information model does not require implausible amounts
of noise in the signal extraction problem. Namely, the amount of estimated noise corresponds
closely to the measurement errors observed in real time data.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 1 and 2 present the model with and
without a signal extraction problem (what we call perfect and imperfect information, respec-
tively) and discuss the econometric methodology. Section 3 discusses the econometric method-
ology. Section 4 presents the main results. The last section oers some concluding remarks.
1 The model without signal extraction
1.1 The Household
There exists an innite number of households distributed over the unit interval and indexed by











where 0 <  < 1 is a constant discount factor, ct denotes consumption in period t, and hjt is the
quantity of labor supplied by the representative household of type j. t is a preference shock
that is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the form
log(t) =  log(t 1) + (1   )log() + ";t
where jj < 1 and ";t   N (0;2
)).
gt denotes an external habit stock which is assumed to be proportional to past aggregate con-
sumption:
gt = #ct 1 with # 2 [0;1):
indexation is close to zero. But the fact that the model without indexation is not rejected by the data does not
mean that it performs the best within a particular class of models.












. However, it turns
out that both c and h are not identied in this model. Our specication amounts to setting c = h = 1.
4In each period, household j faces the budget constraint
Bt + Ptct = Rt 1Bt 1 + Wtht + t (2)
where Bt is nominal bonds. Pt, the nominal price of goods. ct denotes consumption expenditures.
Wt is the nominal wage. 
t is a nominal lump-sum transfer received from the monetary authority
and t denotes the prots distributed to the household by the rms.












1.2.1 Final Good Producers
The nal good, y is produced by combining intermediate goods, yi, by perfectly competitive








di = 1 (5)
where G() is an increasing and concave function. Prot maximization gives rise to the following






























1.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
Each rm i, i 2 (0;1), produces an intermediate good by means of labor according to production
function
yt(i) = atht(i)    (8)
where ht(i) denotes the labor input used by rm i in the production process.  > 0 is a xed
cost. at is an exogenous technology shock which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the
form
log(at) = a log(at 1) + (1   a)log(a) + "a;t
5where jaj < 1 and "a;t   N (0;2
a).
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive, and therefore set prices for the
good they produce. We follow Calvo in assuming that rms set their prices for a stochastic
number of periods. In each and every period, a rm either gets the chance to adjust its price
(an event occurring with probability ) or it does not. If it does not get the chance, then it is
assumed, following Christiano et al.,2005, to set prices according to
Pt(i) = t 1Pt 1(i): (9)
Hence there is perfect indexation to past ination. In the sensitivity analysis we consider alterna-
tive specications involving partial indexation to past ination combined with partial indexation
to either the {variable{ ination target of the central bank or steady state ination.
If a rm i sets its price optimally in period t then it chooses a price, P?







t+(1   ) (P?
t (i)t;   Pt+	t+)yt+(i)
subject to the total demand (6) and
t; =

t  :::  t+ 1 if  > 1
1 otherwise
	t denotes the real marginal cost of the rm.6 t+ is an appropriate discount factor derived
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. Since the price setting scheme is independent of any rm
specic characteristic, all rms that reset their prices will choose the same price, such that
P?
t (i) = P?
t .
In each period, a fraction  of contracts ends and (1 ) survives. Hence, from (7) and the price


















6Since there is only one common technology shock and labor is homogenous, the real marginal cost is the same
across rms.
61.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is conducted according to
log(Rt) = r log(Rt 1)+(1 r)[log(R?)+log(t)+y(log(yt) log(yn
t ))+(log(t) log(t)]+r;t
where t represents the ination target of the central bank and yn
t is the natural rate of output,
that is the output level that would prevail in a exible price economy. r;t is a monetary policy
shock. It follows a Gaussian iid process ("r;t   N (0;2
r)).
We will consider two alternative cases for the ination target. In the rst one, the central bank
targets the constant steady state ination, hence t = . In the second one, following Cogley
and Sbordone, 2006, we assume that the ination target varies over time. In particular, it follows
an AR(1) process of the form
log(t) =  log(t 1) + (1   )log() + ";t
where jj < 1 and ";t   N (0;2
).
1.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, we have yt = ct. Log-linearization of the model around the deterministic steady
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1   #
b yt 1   b zt + b t (13)
b Rt =r b Rt 1 + (1   r)(y(b yt   b yn




2 + '   #
b yn
t 1 +
(1 + ')(1   #)(1   )(1 + )(' + 1)
(2 + '   #)(1   (1   ))
b zt (15)
where ' is the share of xed costs in total output, and  is the curvature of the Kimball goods
market aggregator. b xt = 1 #
1+#(b t   Etb t+1), b zt =
2(1 (1 ))
(1 )(1+)('+1) b at.7 b t is a cost push shock
which is assumed to be iid and normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation .
We will study ve versions of the model, two with perfect and three with imperfect information.
In particular, in the rst version we assume that: the agents have perfect information about all
shocks; the Central Bank targets a constant ination rate ( = 0,  = 0); there is no indexation
to lagged ination in price setting ( = 0); and there are no real rigidities present(# = 0). This
7Note that both b xt and b zt follow the same AR(1) process as their underlying fundamentals, t and at, but the
volatility of the innovations is a simple re{scaling of the original innovations. In order to save on notation, we
will keep  and a to denote the volatilities of the transformed shocks.
7version, which we will call model 1, corresponds to the standard, baseline New Keynesian (NK)
model.8 The second version diers from the rst regarding the price setting scheme as well as
the presence of real rigidities. In particular, here we assume that rms that cannot optimally
reset their prices adopt a backward indexation scheme. And that # is allowed to dier from
zero. This version is denoted as model 2.
The remaining versions introduce imperfect information.9 The third version of the model is
similar to model 1 ( =  =  = # = 0) with the exception that the agents do not observe
the shocks directly and can only infer them through their |perfect| observation of output,
ination and the nominal interest rate. While the observation of the nominal interest rate
and the level of output enables them to infer the preference and monetary policy shock, the
observation of ination is not sucient to help them perfectly distinguish between the persistent
technology and transient cost push shocks. This version, which we call model 3, is |loosely|
motivated by Kydland and Prescott, 1982, and Orphanides, 2002, in the sense that it involves
confusion between temporary and persistent shocks. Under these circumstance, the Central
Bank is assumed to use the best possible estimates of the output gap and the ination gap it
can produce. This leads us to consider a Taylor rule of the type10
b Rt = r b Rt 1 + (1   r)[y(b yt   b yn
tjt) + b t)] + r;t (16)
where xtjt denotes the expected value of variable x conditional on the information set of the
Central Bank, which now consists of output, ination and the nominal interest rate.
The fourth version of the model is similar to the previous one but emphasizes a dierent source
of mis{perception. The agents still observe the same variables, but the imperfect information
problem does not regard distinguishing between persistent technology shocks and transient cost
push shock, but rather distinguishing between persistent ination target shocks and transient
monetary policy shocks. This version {which abstracts from the cost push shocks ( = 0) in
order to be dierentiated from version three above{ is motivated by the work of Cogley and
Sbordone, 2006, who emphasize the role of {unobserved{ variation in the ination target of the
central bank as a driving force of uctuations in output and ination. The central bank is now
8One could also attempt to estimate the baseline NK model augmented with real rigidities. We run into
identication problems when we tried this. But more importantly, real rigidities are a rather controversial modeling
feature, so it makes sense not to impose them on models that have shunned away from them, such as the baseline
NK model or the imperfect information models. Their exclusion from the latter class of models is particularly
useful as a means of assessing the ability of imperfect information to replace {or ameliorate{ all the main inertial
mechanisms of the hybrid NK model.
9We make the assumption that all agents in the model, including the central bank, have the same information
set. Hence, we abstract from issues of private information and informational asymmetries.
10Note that since output and ination are perfectly observed, their perceived value is identical to their actual
value.
8assumed to follow an interest rate rule of the form:11
b Rt = r b Rt 1 + (1   r)[y(b yt   b yn
tjt) + (b t   b ?
t)] + r;t (17)
This version is denoted as model 4. Admittedly, the assumption of symmetric information
between the private agents and the monetary authorities is rather tenuous under these cir-
cumstances. But the technical complications arising from dropping this assumption are rather
prohibitive in this context.
The last |fth| version of the model is like the third version, that is, it re{introduces the
cost{push shocks and drops the ination target shocks. But it adopts a dierent information
structure that makes the informational problem more severe. In particular, here we assume that
some of the variables of the model (shocks and endogenous variables) are measured imprecisely.
We assume that the shocks, output and the ination rate are measured with error, that is, for





t denotes the true value of the variable and !;t is a noisy process that satises E(!;t) =




! if t = k
0 Otherwise
The nominal interest rate is still observed perfectly. In this version, the Central Bank follows
the rule
b Rt = r b Rt 1 + (1   r)[y(b ytjt   b yn
tjt) + b tjt] + r;t (18)
Consequently, the agents face a more severe |and hence, potentially more consequential|
signal extraction problem in the fth version in comparison to the other imperfect information
versions. The motivation for this specication12 comes from Orphanides, 2002, who argues that
a large fraction of the output gap mis{perception during the great ination of the 70s can be
attributed to the mis-measurement of actual output. Using the real time data constructed by the
Philadelphia FED, Collard and Dellas, 2007, have argued that such mis{measurement is present
in all macroeconomic series (including GDP ination) and that it is quantitatively substantial.
The existence of real time data can help assess the plausibility of the estimated amount of noise
in the model by comparing it to that present, say, in data revisions. Or, by comparing perceived
11Note that since output and ination are perfectly observed, their perceived values coincide with their actual
values.
12It should be noted that we are not the rst one to estimate a NK model with signal extraction due to
measurement errors. Lippi and Neri, 2006, estimate such a model but, having a dierent objective, they do not
examine the stochastic properties of their model. Moreover, they do not compare the performance of their model
to that of alternative NK specications, so one cannot judge its relative success.
9values to the corresponding real time data.13 Nonetheless, it should be noted that imperfect
observation of the true values of some of the variables of the system does not have to derive
exclusively or even predominantly from measurement error in aggregate variables for the story




The model is estimated on US quarterly data for the period 1966:I{2002:IV. The data description
and sources can be found in the appendix. Output is measured by real GDP, ination is the
annualized quarterly change in the GDP deator, while the nominal interest rate is the Federal
Funds Rate. The output series is detrended using a linear trend.
Figure 1: US Data




















We do not estimate all the parameters of the model as some of them cannot be identied in
the steady state and do not enter the log{linear representation of the economy. This is the case
13In addition to the measurement error specication of the signal extraction problem presented above there
exists an alternative specication that relies on the distinction between idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We
have opted for the former approach because it is much easier to implement and can also be evaluated using
available extraneous information on real time data. The latter approach involves asymmetric information and
higher order expectations and it much harder to solve and test.
10for the demand elasticity, .14 All the other structural parameters are estimated, including the
steady state level of annualized ination, ?, and real interest rate, r?. The discount factor, ,
is then computed using the estimated level of the real interest rate.15 We therefore estimate
the vector of parameters  = f#;;r?;?;r;;y;a;;;a;;r;;;y;;'g.  is
estimated relying on a Bayesian maximum likelihood procedure. As a rst step of the procedure,
the log{linear system (12){(15) is solved using the Blanchard-Khan method. In the specication
with the signal extraction, the model is solved according to the method outlined in the companion
technical Appendix.16 The one sided Kalman lter is then used on the solution of the model
to form the log{likelihood, Lm(fYtgT
t=1;), of each model, m. Once the posterior mode is
obtained by maximizing the likelihood function, we obtain the posterior density function using
the Metropolis{Hastings algorithm (see Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004).
Table 1 presents the {quite diuse{ prior distribution of the parameters.17 The habit persistence
parameter, #, is beta distributed as it is restricted to belong to the (0,1) interval. The average
of the distribution is set to 0.50, which is in line with the prior distribution used by Smets and
Wouters, 2004. The steady state ination rate and real interest rate have a  -distribution with
means 1% and 0.5% per quarter respectively.
The parameter pertaining to the nominal rigidity is distributed according to a beta distribution
as it belongs in the (0,1) interval. The average probability of price resetting, , is set to 0.50,
implying that a rm expects to reset prices on average every two quarters. The condence
interval, though, encompasses average price resetting from 1.1 to 10 quarters.
The persistence parameter of the Taylor rule, r, has a beta prior over (0,1) so as to guarantee
the stationarity of the rule. The prior distribution is centered on 0.5. The reaction to ination,
, and output, y, is assumed to be positive, and with a normal distribution centered at 1.5
and 0.125 respectively. These values correspond to values commonly used in the literature.
We have little knowledge of the processes that describe the forcing variables. We assume a
beta distribution for the persistence parameters in order to guarantee the stationarity of the
processes. Each distribution is centered on 0.5. Volatility is assumed to follow an inverse
gamma distribution (to guarantee positiveness). However, in order to take into account the
limited knowledge we have regarding these process we impose non informative priors. The same
strategy is also applied to the process of noise in the signal extraction model.
14Following Smets and Wouters, 2007, we set  = 10.
15More precisely, we have  = (1 + r
?=100)
 1=4.
16The technical appendix is available from http://fabcol.free.fr/index.php?page=research.
17In the sensitivity analysis we report results with even more diuse |essentially uninformative| priors as
a means of establishing that the tightness of the priors used does not matter for the obtained ranking of the
alternative models.
11Table 1: Priors
Param. Type Param 1 Param 2 95% HPDI
 Beta 0.50 0.25 [0.096,0.903]
' Beta 0.25 0.125 [0.067,0.457]
 Beta 0.50 0.25 [0.096,0.903]
r? Gamma 0.50 0.50 [0.026,1.501]
? Gamma 1.00 1.00 [0.051,2.996]
r Beta 0.50 0.25 [0.096,0.903]
 Normal 1.50 0.25 [1.088,1.909]
y Normal 0.125 0.05 [0.045,0.207]
a Beta 0.50 0.25 [0.096,0.903]
 Beta 0.50 0.25 [0.096,0.903]
 Beta 0.50 0.25 [0.096,0.903]
a Inv. Gamma 0.20 4.00 [0.17,0.83]
 Inv. Gamma 0.20 4.00 [0.17,0.83]
r Inv. Gamma 0.20 4.00 [0.17,0.83]
 Inv. Gamma 0.20 4.00 [0.17,0.83]
 Inv. Gamma 0.20 4.00 [0.17,0.83]
y Inv. Gamma 0.20 4.00 [0.17,0.83]
 Inv. Gamma 0.20 4.00 [0.17,0.83]
Note: The parameters are distributed independently from each other.
a 95-
percent highest probability density (HPD) credible intervals. The Param 1 and
Param 2 report the mean and the standard deviation of the prior distribution for
Beta, Gamma and Normal distributions. They report the s and  parameters





Table 2 reports the posterior estimates for the ve model versions.18 Figures 2{6 record IRFs
and Table 8 provides information on unconditional moments. The main ndings are summarized
below.
First, the estimated parameters are within the range typically found in the literature. The
main exception to this regards the "persistence" parameters in the hybrid model. In particular,
the persistence parameters of the technology and preference shocks are very low relative to the
values typically reported in the literature (0.04 and 0.26, respectively). At the same time, habit
persistence and the average duration of prices are too high (0.94 and 12 quarters respectively).
Inspection of the model indicates how dicult it is to solve this weak identication problem.19
Moreover, there is information in the sample that helps identify the parameters of the models
as the comparison of the prior to posterior densities reveals. That is, the data are informative.
Second, the models can be ranked in terms of t as measured by the log{likelihood. Within the
models with perfect information, the hybrid version does better than the baseline NK model.
Hence, the inertial dynamics induced by real rigidities and backward indexation are vital for
empirical success. Within the models of imperfect information, the model with the most severe
signal extraction problem (version 5) does best. Comparing across the two classes of models
one can see that the while the hybrid model does better than models 3 and 4 (which in turn
perform better than the baseline version 1), it falls short of model 5. This indicates that while
imperfect information can be a substitute for real rigidities and backward ination indexation,
it must be present in a suciently large amount in order to be a perfect substitute. To see
this point notice that models 4 and {in particular{ 3 lack sucient persistence in the signal
extraction problem. For instance, consider model 3. The complete absence of serial correlation
in the cost{push shock allows the agents to quickly discriminate between this and the persistent
technology shock, leaving little room for inertial dynamics. Inspection of the corresponding
IRFs conrms this. A more direct conrmation can be derived when one compares the paths of
actual and perceived shocks (see Figure 7 in the Appendix). As can be seen, mis{perceptions
are resolved fairly fast. Hence, introducing a limited signal extraction problem to the baseline
NK model and expecting it to outperform the hybrid model may amount to asking for too much.
Nevertheless, making the signal extraction problem somewhat more severe/persistent does the
18The interested reader may consult the technical appendix that accompanies the paper for more details re-
garding the distribution of posterior estimates.
19Note that setting the indexation parameter,  equal to one ameliorates the identication problem signicantly
as it allows the Metropolis{Hastings algorithm to converge. But it does not manage to solve the weak identication
problem. Imposing xed values for some of the persistence parameters would take care of the problem but might
prove unduly restrictive and also undermine the performance of the hybrid model. For instance, when xing the
persistence in the technology and preference shocks to 0.95, the parameter of habit persistence decreases {to 0.52{
and the Calvo parameter increases to 0.38. But marginal likelihood also drops to -277.
13Table 2: Estimation Results
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 { 0.94 { { {
[0.90,0.97]
 0.49 0.08 0.49 0.68 0.22
[0.33,0.64] [0.03,0.14] [0.34,0.64] [0.51,0.83] [0.14,0.31]
' 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.28
[0.04,0.48] [0.07,0.51] [0.05,0.49] [0.02,0.46] [0.06,0.50]
r? 0.61 0.66 0.62 0.56 0.62
[0.31,0.86] [0.36,0.97] [0.34,0.87] [0.11,0.92] [0.22,1.02]
? 0.90 1.01 0.91 0.86 0.97
[0.53,1.24] [0.69,1.33] [0.57,1.26] [0.34,1.30] [0.57,1.34]
r 0.67 0.84 0.67 0.21 0.27
[0.60,0.75] [0.77,0.91] [0.60,0.74] [0.02,0.39] [0.14,0.42]
 1.61 1.40 1.58 2.37 1.64
[1.29,1.90] [1.06,1.75] [1.31,1.90] [2.05,2.70] [1.19,2.10]
y 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.20
[0.04,0.23] [0.00,0.12] [0.05,0.24] [0.03,0.22] [0.11,0.28]
a 0.98 0.07 0.98 0.99 0.95
[0.96,1.00] [0.00,0.18] [0.96,1.00] [0.97,1.00] [0.92,0.97]
 0.91 0.26 0.91 0.92 0.86
[0.85,0.97] [0.09,0.42] [0.85,0.97] [0.85,0.98] [0.80,0.92]
 { { { 0.92 {
[0.86,0.98]
a 0.27 0.11 0.25 0.81 0.12
[0.14,0.44] [0.08,0.14] [0.12,0.40] [0.35,1.38] [0.09,0.16]
 0.16 0.62 0.17 0.20 0.29
[0.11,0.22] [0.48,0.77] [0.12,0.23] [0.16,0.24] [0.21,0.37]
r 0.36 0.26 0.35 0.49 0.13
[0.30,0.41] [0.23,0.29] [0.30,0.41] [0.37,0.63] [0.09,0.16]
 0.14 0.15 0.16 { 0.21
[0.10,0.19] [0.11,0.18] [0.11,0.22] [0.18,0.25]
 { { { 0.11 {
[0.08,0.15]
y { { { { 0.28
[0.10,0.52]
 { { { { 6.72
[2.18,13.15]
L -323.472 -267.388 -321.101 -296.148 -264.729
Note: This table reports the mean of the posterior distribution of each parameter and
the associated 95% HPDI (in brackets). (1): Baseline NK, (2): Hybrid NK (Backward
Indexation, Real Rigidities), (3): Imperfect Info. Temporary vs Permanent Shocks, (4):
Imperfect Info., Cogley{Sbordone, (5): Imperfect Info., Noisy Signals. L denotes the aver-
age log marginal density of the model. 95% HPDI in brackets.
14Table 3: Moments (HP{ltered series)
Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
y 1.56 1.47 1.56 1.45 1.21 1.15
[1.27,1.67] [1.26,1.89] [1.25,1.64] [1.07,1.36] [1.02,1.28]
 0.30 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.35 0.30
[0.33,0.43] [0.40,0.51] [0.33,0.42] [0.31,0.39] [0.26,0.33]
R 0.44 0.37 0.49 0.37 0.43 0.35
[0.33,0.41] [0.40,0.59] [0.33,0.41] [0.38,0.48] [0.31,0.40]
(;y) 0.12 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.09 0.21
[0.12,0.36] [0.05,0.34] [0.13,0.38] [0.02,0.16] [0.13,0.29]
(R;y) 0.34 -0.25 -0.21 -0.25 -0.05 0.26
[-0.37,-0.13] [-0.40,-0.01] [-0.36,-0.13] [-0.12,0.02] [0.11,0.41]
y(1) 0.87 0.65 0.85 0.63 0.71 0.68
[0.63,0.68] [0.81,0.89] [0.60,0.66] [0.69,0.72] [0.66,0.71]
(1) 0.48 0.37 0.72 0.40 0.42 0.33
[0.30,0.45] [0.69,0.75] [0.33,0.46] [0.33,0.52] [0.22,0.43]
R(1) 0.82 0.65 0.81 0.65 0.73 0.71
[0.59,0.70] [0.77,0.86] [0.60,0.71] [0.69,0.76] [0.66,0.77]
y(2) 0.69 0.41 0.64 0.39 0.47 0.43
[0.38,0.44] [0.58,0.71] [0.34,0.42] [0.46,0.48] [0.40,0.47]
(2) 0.31 0.13 0.47 0.14 0.25 0.20
[0.07,0.20] [0.42,0.50] [0.08,0.21] [0.18,0.31] [0.12,0.27]
R(2) 0.58 0.40 0.61 0.40 0.47 0.44
[0.33,0.46] [0.55,0.67] [0.34,0.46] [0.43,0.51] [0.38,0.51]
y(4) 0.27 0.08 0.25 0.07 0.12 0.08
[0.06,0.10] [0.16,0.34] [0.04,0.10] [0.11,0.12] [0.05,0.11]
(4) 0.24 -0.06 0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.01
[-0.08,-0.03] [0.03,0.13] [-0.09,-0.03] [-0.00,0.05] [-0.01,0.04]
R(4) 0.25 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.06
[0.01,0.10] [0.16,0.29] [0.01,0.10] [0.05,0.13] [0.01,0.11]
Note: (1): Baseline NK, (2): Hybrid NK (Backward Indexation, Real Rigidities), (3):
Imperfect Info. Temporary vs Permanent Shocks, (4): Imperfect Info., Cogley{Sbordone,
(5): Imperfect Info., Noisy Signals. 95% HPDI in brackets.
15job. Namely, it gives the baseline model the feature it needs in order to match the data well.
The comparisons of the IRFs and moments across models oers some clues regarding not only
the reasons for the dierences in their relative performance but also about the driving forces in
each model. The most successful models (2,4 and 5) tend to exhibit inertia in ination dynamics
while the less successful ones (1 and 3) do not. Good performance at this front seems to play
an important role, as the dierences in performance across models in the realm of unconditional
moments tend to be quite small (see Table 3, which follows standard practice and used HP
ltered data, or Table 8 in the appendix which used linearly detrended data. ).
Note that the main contributor to ination inertia diers across the three specications. In
the perfect information model with indexation, ination inertia comes from the two demand
disturbances (the preference and the monetary policy shock). In the model with the variable
ination target, it arises exclusively from the ination target shock while in the model with
measurement errors, from the preference shock. Hence the three models dier regarding their
identication of the cause of inertia between |direct| policy and non{policy factors.
The mechanism for ination inertia in the model of indexation is well known, so let us examine
the mechanisms in the models with imperfect information. Figures 9{10 plot the actual and
perceived paths of the shocks in the fourth and fth models. As can be seen, the agents under{
react to the shocks. It also takes them considerable time to recognize the true nature of the shock
that has aicted the economy. For instance, consider a positive ination target shock (a higher
ination target). If the shock were perfectly observable, everybody's expectation and hence
actual ination would jump up and then, given the AR(1) assumption on the shock, it would
monotonically decline. But if the shock is not observed then the agents cannot tell whether the
lower nominal interest rate and higher ination should be expected to persist in the future or
not (as it would not if the shock represented a purely transient monetary disturbance ("e;t)).
As time goes one and the agents continue observing a lower nominal interest rate they become
more convinced that an ination target shock has taken place and ination increase relative to
the initial period. Due to the AR(1) nature of the shock, it reaches a peak after a few periods
and then starts declining towards the initial steady state.
Judging the mis{perceptions story
Models with measurement errors and signal extraction are often criticized as requiring implau-
sibly large amounts of imperfect information in order to deliver good results. In model 5 we
have attributed the mis{perception problem to measurement errors associated with preliminary
data releases. In order to judge the contribution of this mechanism, one could compare the
properties of the noise in the model to that present in real time data. A natural way of doing so
is by computing the volatility of the data revisions in the real world (for instance, initial minus
nal release) and the volatility between the actual and the perceived values in the model. The
16underlying assumption here is that the actual value corresponds to the nal revision while the
perceived value to the preliminary release. Hence, the revision in, say, GDPt is, log(Ytjt) log(Yt)
where the former represents the initial and the latter the nal release.
Table 4 presents information on the properties of these revisions.20
Table 4: The properties {moments{ of data revisions
Whole Sample Post 1982
Data Model Data Model
" 0.22,1.51 0.94 0.19,1.97 0.78
[0.83,1.05] [0.66,0.91]
"y 0.54,0.68 0.51 0.40,0.58 0.37
[0.41,0.61] [0.29,0.46]
(";) 0.14,-0.09 0.24 0.08,-0.12 0.23
[0.14,0.33] [0.15,0.32]
("y;y) 0.38,0.28 0.86 0.53,0.28 0.74
[0.78,0.93] [0.60,0.88]
"(1) 0.12,0.00 -0.03 0.04,-0.02 -0.04
[-0.04,-0.02] [-0.06,-0.03]
"y(1) -0.09,-0.12 -0.03 -0.16,-0.24 -0.03
[-0.04,-0.02] [-0.04,-0.02]
Note: " is the revision in ination and "y in output growth.  is standard
deviation,  is cross-correlation and (1) is 1st order autocorrelation. The rst
number in column 1 and 3 corresponds to the computation from a single vintage,
and the second number to the computation from two successive vintages (for
details see the footnote). 95% HPDI in brackets.
Several observations are in order. First, the amount of noise the model needs in tting the
data is not excessive relative to that present in data revisions. Second, the assumption made in
the model that the correlation between the measurement error and the initial release is zero is
satised in the data for ination but not for output. In other words, the initial release seems to
contain information about future releases, or equivalently, the measurement error is correlated
with the business cycle. This is an interesting observation that has implications for the ability
of the \noisy aggregate variables" theory of the business cycle to t the data. In particular,
it seems quite conceivable that incorporating a more realistic model of measurement error in
model 5 could further improve its performance. While pursuing this track is outside the scope
of the present paper it certainly represents a promising line of future research. And third, there
20Some caveats are in order. First, there is a dierence in timing between the real world and the model. In
particular, in the model we assume that the observation xtjt is available in period t. In the real world, data are
released with a one period lag, that is, xtjt+1 rather than xtjt is the data available. And second, in computing
growth rates one may either use data from the same vintage (which then already includes a revision) or from two
successive vintages. That is, either xtjt = log(xtjt)   log(xt 1jt) or xtjt = log(xtjt)   log(xt 1jt 1). It is not
obvious which measure is more relevant for testing mis{perceptions in a model where agents' decisions involve
levels of variables and there is no lag in the release of information. Consequently, we have chosen to report both
measures.
17is no serial correlation in the revisions.
4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we discuss the implications of alternative specications in order to judge the
robustness of the main results and rankings reported above. The likelihood results from these
exercises are reported in Tables 5 and 6.21
A natural question regards the importance of the distribution of the priors for the results ob-
tained. It is should be clear from inspection of Table 1 that the priors we employ in the
estimation above are quite diuse. For instance, the 95% condence interval for the Calvo
parameter encompasses average price resetting from 1.1 to 10 quarters. Nonetheless, it may
be worth repeating the analysis with even {essentially uninformative{ atter priors. Table 7
reports the new priors. Table 5 reports the posterior likelihood attained by each model both in
the benchmark case and when diuse priors are used. Inspection of the table shows an increase
in the log{likelihood for all models, which indicates that the choice of the degree of tightness of
the priors does matter. Nonetheless, the ranking of the alternative models is identical to that
reported before. This is encouraging and should help dispel any concerns that our results may
have been driven by the choice of the distribution of the priors.
Table 5: Likelihood: Sensitivity Analysis (Tightness of Priors, Period of Estimation)
Model Benchmark Diuse Priors Post{1982 period
(1) -323.472 -313.883 -111.093
(2) -267.388 -258.469 -111.131
(3) -321.101 -317.726 -108.155
(4) -296.148 -276.183 -109.042
(5) -264.729 -255.363 -107.385
Monetary policy in the models considered here is perfectly credible. Consequently, and to the
extent that the monetary authorities have a known, long term, ination target, it is sensible to
assume that the non-optimizing rms in model 2 would select to index their prices not only to
past ination but also to the ination target itself. We have thus repeated the analysis using




t Pt 1(i), where t, the ination target of the central
bank, follows an AR(1) process of the form:
log(t) =  log(t 1) + (1   )log() + ";t:
The second row in Table 6 presents the outcome of the estimation of this variant of model 2.
21More detailed results are reported in a companion technical appendix which is available on the authors' web
pages.
18There is no improvement relative the benchmark case reported above.
Allowing for partial indexation to past ination also allows us to address a possible concern one
might have from our having imposed perfect indexation ( = 1) in the estimation in section
3. If the backward price indexation component is less than unity, then imposing a value of
unity could disadvantage the hybrid model vis a vis the other models. We have therefore
carried out the exercise for alternative values of the backward price indexation parameter22
( = 0:25;0:50;0:75). Again there is no improvement in the performance of the model.
Table 6: Likelihood: Sensitivity Analysis (Hybrid NK Model)
Model Likelihood
Benchmark -267.388
Past Ination (=0.25) -281.865
Past Ination (=0.50) -279.587
Past Ination (=0.75) -275.926
C.B. Ination Target (=0.58) -278.186
For model 5, we have assumed that the agents observe both output and ination with error.
With only three endogenous variables this is necessary in order to make the signal extraction
problem severe enough and give imperfect information a ghting chance to play a role in shaping
the properties of the model. Nonetheless, it is of interest to see how the properties of the model
would be aected if we minimized the role of mis{perceptions by allowing agents to also perfectly
observe the ination rate alongside the nominal interest rate.23 In this case, the performance
of this version of the model deteriorates signicantly as the signal extraction problem becomes
quite trivial. Our view is that the important issue here is not actually whether the ination
rate is accurately, contemporaneously observed or not but rather whether there is enough noise
present in the system to make signal extraction a dicult task. A model with more variables
could possess this property even if ination were made observed with little noise as long as other
endogenous variables were noisy and the structure of the model were such that the observation
of ination did not undermine the signal extraction problem.
A nal sensitivity check carried out was to estimate the models for the post 1982 period. As
is well known, this period has been associated with a signicant decline in the volatility of
ination and output and, as revealed by IRFs of ination, the reduction of inertia in ination.
This implies that a model, such as the hybrid, whose additional features relative to the baseline
NK model aim to better capture inertia and volatility may not perform as well as in the full
sample period. The last column of Table 5 shows that this conjecture is correct. The hybrid
model does not improve upon the baseline model during that period. Table 5 also shows that the
22Price indexation now takes the form: Pt(i) = 

t 1
1 Pt 1(i), where  denotes steady state ination.
23More detailed results are reported in the accompanying appendix.
19imperfect information models do better than the two perfect information models. It is tempting
to claim that these ndings suggest that imperfect information may represent a more structural
business cycle mechanism than other, commonly employed features (such as real rigidities or
backward indexation). Nonetheless, the dierences in the marginal likelihood across models are
rather small, so this claim remains tenuous and deserves further investigation.
5 Conclusions
The concepts of imperfect information and mis{perceptions have a distinguished presence in
macroeconomic theory going back to Lucas', 1972, and Kydland and Prescott's 1982, seminal
work. Notwithstanding this history and also in spite of Orphanides' inuential work on the
role of mis{perceptions in the great ination of the 70s, macroeconomic theory has more or less
stayed clear of them. In this paper we have undertaken a comprehensive analysis of its role
in US business cycles during the last 40 years using the New Keynesian model as the vehicle
for the analysis. In particular, we have examined the performance of the model under dierent
structures of information which are motivated by inuential suggestions in the literature, such
as unobserved variation in ination target (Cogley and Sbordone, 2006) or, confusion between
transitory and persistent real shocks (Kydland and Prescott, 1982, Orphanides, 2002). We found
that imperfect information plays an important role in accounting for the US business cycle and it
can help the NK model match key dynamic properties of the data (inertia, persistence) without
any need for other, popular inertial features (such as real rigidities and backward price index-
ation schemes. Moreover, its success is not conned to a sample that also includes \unusual"
macroeconomic behavior (the 70s) but it also extends to a period that only contains the great
moderation. This makes us speculate that imperfect information may represent a structural
business cycle mechanism than applies to a variety of macroeconomic environments.
Importantly, this good performance does not hinge on implausibly large amount of informational
frictions. Even the version with the most severe information problems (the one with measure-
ment errors) requires a degree of mis{perception that is well within the range observed in real
time data. Nonetheless, given the fact that measurement errors in the real world do not fully
conform to the standard assumption of independence made in the model, a fruitful line of future
research may involve building more involved models of measurement error and incorporating
them into the model in order to judge whether such errors truly constitute an important source
of mis{perceptions.
206 References
Angeletos, Marios and Jennifer La'O, 2009, \Higher-order Beliefs and the Business Cycle",
mimeo MIT.
Christiano, Lawrence, Charles Evans and Martin Eichenbaum, 2005, \Nominal Rigidities and
the Dynamic Eects of a Shock to Monetary Policy", Journal of Political Economy, 113(1):
1{45.
Cogley, Timothy and Argia Sbordone, 2006, \Trend Ination and Ination Persistence in the
New Keynesian", American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Collard, Fabrice and Harris Dellas, 2007, \Misperceived vs Unanticipated Money: A Synthesis,"
mimeo.
Dellas, Harris, 2006, \Monetary Shocks and Ination Dynamics in the New Keynesian Model",
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(2): 54355.
De Walque, Gregory, Frank Smets and Raf Wouters, 2004, \Price Setting in General Equilibrium:
Alternative Specications," mimeo.
Eichenbaum, Martin and Jonas Fisher, 2004, \Evaluating the Calvo Model of Sticky Prices,"
NBER WP No. 10617.
Gal , Jordi and Mark Gertler, 1999, \Ination Dynamics: A Structural Econometric Analysis",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 44(2), 195-222.
Kydland, Finn and Edward Prescott, 1982, \Time-to-build and Aggregate Fluctuations", Econo-
metrica, 50 (6), 1345-1370.
Lippi, Francesco and Stefano Neri, 2007, \Information Variables for Monetary Policy in an
Estimated Structural Model of the Euro Area," Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Lorenzoni, Guido, 2006, \Imperfect Information, Consumers' Expectations and Business Cy-
cles", mimeo.
Lucas, Robert E., 1972, \Expectations and the Neutrality of Money", Journal of Economic
Theory, 4: 103124.
21Sims, Christopher, 2003, \Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics,
50, pp. 665690.
Smets, Frank and Raf Wouters, 2003, \An Estimated Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium
Model of the Euro Area", Journal of European Economic Association, 1,pp. 1123{1175.
Smets, Frank and Raf Wouters, 2007, \Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian
DSGE Approach," American Economic Review, 97(3), pp. 586{606.
Woodford, Michael, 2003, \Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Eects of Monetary Policy,"
in: P. Aghion, R. Frydman, J. Stiglitz and M. Woodford, Eds, Knowledge, Information, and
Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, pp. 2558.
Woodford, Michael, 2003, Interest and prices, Princeton University Press.
22A Data
output = log(GDPC96/LNSindex )100
ination = log(GDPDEF/GDPDEF(-1))100
interest rate = Federal Funds Rate/4
Source of the original data:
 GDPC96 : Real Gross Domestic Product - Billions of Chained 1996 Dollars, Seasonally
Adjusted Annual Rate Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis.
 GDPDEF : Gross Domestic Product - Implicit Price Deator - 1996=100, Seasonally
Adjusted Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
 Federal Funds Rate : Averages of Daily Figures - Percent Source: Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System
 LNS10000000 : Labor Force Status : Civilian noninstitutional population - Age : 16 years
and over - Seasonally Adjusted - Number in thousands Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Before 1976: LFU800000000 : Population level - 16 Years and Older)
 LNSindex : LNS10000000(1992:3)=1
23B Figures 1966{2002



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29B.1 The degree of mis-perceptions of shocks
Figure 7: IRF: Actual vs Perceived | Imperfect info, Pers. vs Temp
(a) Technology Shock



























(b) Cost Push Shock




























Note: Plain line: True, Dashed line: Perceived
30Figure 8: IRF: Actual vs Perceived | Imperfect info, Pers. vs Temp.
(a) Technology Shock






































(b) Cost Push Shock









































Note: Plain line: True, Dashed line: Perceived
Figure 9: IRF: Actual vs Perceived | Imperfect info, Ination target shock
(a) Monetary Policy Shock








































(b) Ination Target Shock





































Note: Plain line: True, Dashed line: Perceived

































































































































































































Note: Plain line: True, Dashed line: Perceived
32Figure 11: IRF: Actual vs Perceived | Imperfect info, Measurement errors
(a) Technology Shock


























































(c) Cost Push Shock





























Note: Plain line: True, Dashed line: Perceived
33Technical Appendix
Not Intended for Publication
A Robustness Analysis
Table 7: Diuse Priors
Param. Type Param 1 Param 2 95% HPDI
# Uniform 0.00 1.00 [0.025;0.975]
 Uniform 0.00 1.00 [0.025;0.975]
' Uniform 0.00 1.00 [0.025;0.975]
r? Uniform 0.00 4.00 [0.10;3.90]
? Uniform 0.00 4.00 [0.10;3.90]
r Uniform 0.00 1.00 [0.025;0.975]
 Normal 1.50 0.50 [0.52;2.47]
y Normal 0.125 0.05 [0.027;0.222]
a Uniform 0.00 1.00 [0.025;0.975]
 Uniform 0.00 1.00 [0.025;0.975]
 Uniform 0.50 0.50 [0.025;0.975]
a Invgamma 0.20 4.00 [0.10;0.38]
 Invgamma 0.20 4.00 [0.10;0.38]
r Invgamma 0.20 4.00 [0.10;0.38]
 Invgamma 0.20 4.00 [0.10;0.38]
 Invgamma 0.20 4.00 [0.10;0.38]
y Invgamma 0.20 4.00 [0.10;0.38]
 Invgamma 0.20 4.00 [0.10;0.38]
Note: The parameters are distributed independently from each other.
a 95-percent highest probability density (HPD) credible intervals
(see ?, p.57). The Param 1 and Param 2 report the lower and
upper bounds for Uniform distributions, the mean and the standard
deviation for the Normal distributions. They report the s and 





34Table 8: Moments: Data linearly detrended
Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
y 3.37 5.87 4.09 6.11 6.76 2.50
[3.11,9.86] [2.49,5.94] [2.95,10.39] [3.13,12.08] [2.00,3.09]
 0.62 0.55 0.70 0.54 0.62 0.51
[0.45,0.68] [0.57,0.85] [0.44,0.67] [0.48,0.81] [0.41,0.61]
R 0.79 0.74 0.89 0.72 0.93 0.60
[0.55,1.00] [0.70,1.10] [0.53,0.97] [0.63,1.33] [0.48,0.74]
(;y) -0.27 -0.18 0.08 -0.17 -0.06 -0.01
[-0.35,-0.04] [-0.26,0.37] [-0.32,-0.03] [-0.10,-0.02] [-0.15,0.15]
(R;y) -0.39 -0.32 -0.36 -0.31 -0.13 0.03
[-0.52,-0.12] [-0.65,-0.05] [-0.50,-0.12] [-0.23,-0.04] [-0.17,0.27]
y(1) 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.93
[0.94,1.00] [0.95,0.99] [0.94,1.00] [0.97,1.00] [0.90,0.96]
(1) 0.87 0.69 0.88 0.70 0.81 0.76
[0.56,0.82] [0.83,0.92] [0.57,0.83] [0.71,0.90] [0.66,0.85]
R(1) 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.90 0.93 0.89
[0.85,0.96] [0.91,0.96] [0.84,0.96] [0.89,0.98] [0.85,0.94]
y(2) 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.86
[0.89,0.99] [0.87,0.98] [0.89,1.00] [0.94,1.00] [0.81,0.91]
(2) 0.83 0.56 0.75 0.57 0.74 0.71
[0.39,0.74] [0.67,0.84] [0.39,0.73] [0.61,0.87] [0.60,0.80]
R(2) 0.84 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.86 0.79
[0.74,0.92] [0.80,0.91] [0.73,0.91] [0.77,0.95] [0.71,0.87]
y(4) 0.79 0.91 0.82 0.91 0.95 0.76
[0.81,0.99] [0.70,0.93] [0.82,0.99] [0.89,1.00] [0.67,0.84]
(4) 0.79 0.44 0.54 0.44 0.64 0.62
[0.25,0.64] [0.40,0.69] [0.26,0.65] [0.46,0.80] [0.51,0.73]
R(4) 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.74 0.61
[0.58,0.86] [0.55,0.80] [0.55,0.84] [0.59,0.90] [0.50,0.73]
Note: (1): Baseline NK, (2): Hybrid NK (Backward Indexation, Real Rigidities), (3):
Imperfect Info. Temporary vs Permanent Shocks, (4): Imperfect Info., Cogley{Sbordone,
(5): Imperfect Info., Noisy Signals.
35B Detailed Tables, 1966-2002
Table 9: Posteriors { Perfect Info, Forward NK
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.08 [ 0.33, 0.64]
' 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.11 [ 0.04, 0.48]
r? 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.14 [ 0.31, 0.86]
? 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.18 [ 0.53, 1.24]
r 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.04 [ 0.60, 0.75]
 1.54 1.61 1.60 0.16 [ 1.29, 1.90]
y 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.05 [ 0.04, 0.23]
a 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.01 [ 0.96, 1.00]
 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.03 [ 0.85, 0.97]
a 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.08 [ 0.14, 0.44]
 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.03 [ 0.11, 0.22]
r 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.03 [ 0.30, 0.41]
 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.02 [ 0.10, 0.19]
Average log marginal density: -323.472
36Table 10: Posteriors { Perfect Info, Hybrid NK
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.02 [ 0.90, 0.97]
 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.03 [ 0.03, 0.14]
' 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.11 [ 0.07, 0.51]
r? 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.15 [ 0.36, 0.97]
? 1.03 1.01 1.01 0.16 [ 0.69, 1.33]
r 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.04 [ 0.77, 0.91]
 1.40 1.40 1.38 0.18 [ 1.06, 1.75]
y 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 [ 0.00, 0.12]
a 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.05 [ 0.00, 0.18]
 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.08 [ 0.09, 0.42]
a 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.02 [ 0.08, 0.14]
 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.07 [ 0.48, 0.77]
r 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.02 [ 0.23, 0.29]
 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.02 [ 0.11, 0.18]
Average log marginal density: -267.388
Table 11: Posteriors { Imperfect Info, Pers. vs Temp.
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.08 [ 0.34, 0.64]
' 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.11 [ 0.05, 0.49]
r? 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.13 [ 0.34, 0.87]
? 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.17 [ 0.57, 1.26]
r 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.04 [ 0.60, 0.74]
 1.50 1.58 1.58 0.15 [ 1.31, 1.90]
y 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.05 [ 0.05, 0.24]
a 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.01 [ 0.96, 1.00]
 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.03 [ 0.85, 0.97]
a 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.08 [ 0.12, 0.40]
 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.03 [ 0.12, 0.23]
r 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.03 [ 0.30, 0.41]
 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.03 [ 0.11, 0.22]
Average log marginal density: -321.101
37Table 12: Posteriors { Imperfect info, Ination target shock
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.08 [ 0.51, 0.83]
' 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.12 [ 0.02, 0.46]
r? 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.21 [ 0.11, 0.92]
? 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.24 [ 0.34, 1.30]
r 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.10 [ 0.02, 0.39]
 2.33 2.37 2.37 0.17 [ 2.05, 2.70]
y 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.05 [ 0.03, 0.22]
a 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01 [ 0.97, 1.00]
 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.03 [ 0.85, 0.98]
 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.03 [ 0.86, 0.98]
a 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.28 [ 0.35, 1.38]
 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.02 [ 0.16, 0.24]
r 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.07 [ 0.37, 0.63]
 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.02 [ 0.08, 0.15]
Average log marginal density: -296.147
Table 13: Posteriors { Imperfect info, Measurement errors
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.04 [ 0.14, 0.31]
' 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.11 [ 0.06, 0.50]
r? 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.20 [ 0.22, 1.02]
? 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.20 [ 0.57, 1.34]
r 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.07 [ 0.14, 0.42]
 1.62 1.64 1.64 0.23 [ 1.19, 2.10]
y 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.04 [ 0.11, 0.28]
a 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.01 [ 0.92, 0.97]
 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.03 [ 0.80, 0.92]
a 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.02 [ 0.09, 0.16]
 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.04 [ 0.21, 0.37]
r 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.02 [ 0.09, 0.16]
 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.02 [ 0.18, 0.25]
y 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.12 [ 0.10, 0.52]
 4.34 6.72 6.10 3.02 [ 2.18, 13.15]
Average log marginal density: -264.729
38B.1 Detailed Tables, More diuse priors
Table 14: Posteriors { Perfect Info, Forward NK
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.12 [0.35,0.77]
' 0.40 0.48 0.46 0.28 [0.01,0.93]
r? 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.14 [0.36,0.94]
? 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.18 [0.59,1.32]
r 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.04 [0.60,0.75]
 1.55 1.64 1.64 0.18 [1.29,2.02]
y 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.07 [0.02,0.28]
a 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.01 [0.96,1.00]
 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.03 [0.86,0.98]
a 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.09 [0.14,0.48]
 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.03 [0.11,0.21]
r 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.03 [0.30,0.42]
 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.03 [0.10,0.19]
Average log marginal density: -313.883
39Table 15: Posteriors { Perfect Info, Hybrid NK
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.02 [ 0.90, 0.98]
 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.04 [ 0.03, 0.17]
' 1.00 0.56 0.58 0.26 [ 0.12, 1.00]
r? 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.15 [ 0.40, 0.99]
? 1.15 1.03 1.03 0.16 [ 0.73, 1.34]
r 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.04 [ 0.77, 0.92]
 1.26 1.40 1.37 0.22 [ 1.00, 1.83]
y 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.03 [ 0.00, 0.09]
a 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.05 [ 0.00, 0.15]
 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.08 [ 0.07, 0.40]
a 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.02 [ 0.08, 0.14]
 0.47 0.63 0.63 0.07 [ 0.49, 0.78]
r 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.02 [ 0.23, 0.30]
 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.02 [ 0.10, 0.18]
Average log marginal density: -258.469
Table 16: Posteriors { Imperfect Info, Pers. vs Temp.
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.12 [ 0.34, 0.77]
' 0.60 0.51 0.51 0.27 [ 0.06, 0.98]
r? 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.14 [ 0.37, 0.93]
? 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.18 [ 0.60, 1.31]
r 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.04 [ 0.60, 0.76]
 1.48 1.59 1.58 0.19 [ 1.20, 1.96]
y 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.07 [ 0.04, 0.31]
a 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01 [ 0.97, 1.00]
 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.03 [ 0.85, 0.97]
a 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.09 [ 0.11, 0.41]
 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.03 [ 0.11, 0.23]
r 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.03 [ 0.30, 0.42]
 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.03 [ 0.11, 0.22]
Average log marginal density: -317.726
40Table 17: Posteriors { Imperfect info, Ination target shock
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.70 0.76 0.78 0.10 [ 0.56, 0.91]
' 0.14 0.38 0.36 0.23 [ 0.00, 0.74]
r? 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.25 [ 0.15, 1.16]
? 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.27 [ 0.39, 1.47]
r 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.11 [ 0.00, 0.37]
 2.90 3.03 3.01 0.29 [ 2.47, 3.61]
y 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.07 [ 0.02, 0.26]
a 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.01 [ 0.97, 1.00]
 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.03 [ 0.86, 0.98]
 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.03 [ 0.89, 0.99]
a 1.14 1.04 1.00 0.33 [ 0.44, 1.71]
 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.02 [ 0.18, 0.25]
r 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.09 [ 0.43, 0.78]
 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.02 [ 0.08, 0.14]
Average log marginal density: -276.183
Table 18: Posteriors { Imperfect info, Measurement errors
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.07 [ 0.15, 0.42]
' 0.50 0.60 0.64 0.27 [ 0.11, 1.00]
r? 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.21 [ 0.28, 1.11]
? 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.19 [ 0.59, 1.34]
r 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.08 [ 0.14, 0.44]
 1.61 1.76 1.74 0.39 [ 1.00, 2.45]
y 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.06 [ 0.11, 0.35]
a 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.01 [ 0.92, 0.97]
 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.03 [ 0.80, 0.93]
a 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.02 [ 0.09, 0.16]
 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.04 [ 0.22, 0.38]
r 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.02 [ 0.09, 0.17]
 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.02 [ 0.18, 0.25]
y 0.20 0.28 0.24 0.13 [ 0.11, 0.53]
 4.33 6.39 5.81 2.85 [ 2.08, 12.47]
Average log marginal density: -255.363
41B.2 Detailed Tables, Alternative Specications
Table 19: Posteriors { Perfect Info, Hybrid NK (Partial indexation to the ination target)
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.02 [0.88,0.97]
 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.02 [0.03,0.12]
 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.05 [0.79,0.97]
' 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.11 [0.07,0.51]
r? 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.12 [0.42,0.92]
? 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.13 [0.75,1.27]
r 0.84 0.76 0.76 0.06 [0.64,0.86]
 1.21 1.21 1.19 0.13 [1.01,1.47]
y 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 [0.00,0.03]
a 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.06 [0.00,0.19]
 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.09 [0.12,0.45]
 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.07 [0.00,0.22]
a 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.02 [0.09,0.16]
 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.07 [0.45,0.74]
r 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.03 [0.17,0.29]
 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.02 [0.09,0.16]
Average log marginal density: -278.186
42Table 20: Posteriors { Imperfect info, Measurement errors (R and  are perfectly observable)
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.08 [0.34,0.64]
' 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.12 [0.05,0.50]
r? 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.13 [0.37,0.89]
? 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.17 [0.54,1.24]
r 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.04 [0.60,0.74]
 1.49 1.57 1.56 0.16 [1.27,1.88]
y 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.05 [0.05,0.24]
a 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.01 [0.96,1.00]
 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.03 [0.84,0.96]
a 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.07 [0.12,0.39]
 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.03 [0.12,0.26]
r 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.03 [0.30,0.41]
 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.03 [0.10,0.20]
y 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.08 [0.10,0.38]
Average log marginal density: -324.209
43C Detailed Tables, Post{1982
Table 21: Posteriors { Perfect Info, Forward NK (Post 82 period)
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.62 0.75 0.76 0.09 [0.57,0.91]
' 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.12 [0.02,0.46]
r? 0.15 0.75 0.73 0.38 [0.08,1.46]
? 0.01 0.52 0.50 0.30 [0.00,1.04]
r 0.57 0.37 0.38 0.14 [0.10,0.61]
 2.15 2.25 2.25 0.15 [1.98,2.55]
y 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.05 [0.04,0.23]
a 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01 [0.97,1.00]
 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.01 [0.95,1.00]
a 0.37 1.12 1.07 0.54 [0.28,2.22]
 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.01 [0.10,0.15]
r 0.27 0.36 0.35 0.06 [0.25,0.48]
 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.03 [0.09,0.21]
Average log marginal density: -111.093007
44Table 22: Posteriors { Perfect Info, Hybrid NK (Post 82 period)
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.58 0.89 0.91 0.09 [0.76,0.99]
 0.47 0.14 0.12 0.09 [0.02,0.27]
' 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.11 [0.06,0.51]
r? 0.93 0.80 0.80 0.22 [0.34,1.20]
? 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.18 [0.39,1.14]
r 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.05 [0.69,0.90]
 1.94 1.52 1.50 0.23 [1.08,1.99]
y 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.05 [0.01,0.18]
a 0.98 0.14 0.08 0.20 [0.00,0.74]
 0.87 0.63 0.64 0.13 [0.36,0.86]
a 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.03 [0.07,0.14]
 0.11 0.27 0.26 0.08 [0.12,0.41]
r 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.02 [0.16,0.24]
 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.02 [0.10,0.17]
Average log marginal density: -111.131
Table 23: Posteriors { Imperfect Info, Pers. vs Temp. (Post 82 period)
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.10 [0.45,0.85]
' 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.11 [0.03,0.46]
r? 0.15 0.78 0.77 0.37 [0.09,1.45]
? 0.00 0.55 0.54 0.30 [0.01,1.08]
r 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.11 [0.24,0.65]
 2.16 2.20 2.19 0.15 [1.90,2.48]
y 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.05 [0.05,0.24]
a 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01 [0.97,1.00]
 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.01 [0.95,1.00]
a 0.45 0.61 0.52 0.37 [0.15,1.30]
 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.01 [0.10,0.15]
r 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.05 [0.24,0.43]
 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.04 [0.11,0.27]
Average log marginal density: -108.155552
45Table 24: Posteriors { Imperfect info, Ination target shock (Post 82 period)
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.63 0.67 0.68 0.09 [0.50,0.83]
' 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.12 [0.02,0.46]
r? 0.13 0.76 0.74 0.37 [0.07,1.44]
? 0.01 0.52 0.51 0.30 [0.00,1.04]
r 0.40 0.30 0.31 0.12 [0.06,0.53]
 2.20 2.25 2.24 0.15 [1.96,2.54]
y 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.05 [0.04,0.22]
a 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.01 [0.97,1.00]
 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.01 [0.95,1.00]
 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.11 [0.10,0.55]
a 0.44 0.62 0.57 0.22 [0.27,1.09]
 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.01 [0.10,0.15]
r 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.06 [0.11,0.32]
 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.03 [0.13,0.26]
Average log marginal density: -109.042291
Table 25: Posteriors { Imperfect info, Measurement errors (Post 82 period)
Param. Mode Mean Median Std. Dev. 95% HPDI
 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.04 [ 0.10, 0.26]
' 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.11 [ 0.07, 0.51]
r? 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.19 [ 0.60, 1.33]
? 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.15 [ 0.46, 1.04]
r 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.09 [ 0.20, 0.56]
 1.70 1.73 1.73 0.22 [ 1.30, 2.17]
y 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.04 [ 0.10, 0.27]
a 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.03 [ 0.84, 0.94]
 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.03 [ 0.87, 0.96]
a 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.01 [ 0.07, 0.13]
 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.03 [ 0.16, 0.29]
r 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.02 [ 0.09, 0.15]
 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.02 [ 0.13, 0.20]
y 0.20 0.27 0.24 0.13 [ 0.11, 0.52]
 2.97 4.43 4.04 2.22 [ 0.87, 8.78]
Average log marginal density: -107.385365
46Table 26: Moments (Post 82 period)
Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
y 2.08 5.38 3.64 5.53 5.52 1.76
[2.20,9.81] [1.82,6.14] [2.34,10.06] [2.30,9.92] [1.36,2.19]
 0.28 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.64 0.37
[0.32,1.10] [0.42,0.97] [0.31,1.05] [0.32,1.12] [0.29,0.46]
R 0.65 1.32 0.90 1.25 1.34 0.64
[0.58,2.43] [0.65,1.22] [0.55,2.25] [0.58,2.51] [0.46,0.86]
(;y) -0.05 -0.07 0.35 -0.07 -0.06 0.31
[-0.13,-0.01] [-0.21,0.72] [-0.14,-0.01] [-0.12,-0.01] [0.07,0.55]
(R;y) 0.16 -0.09 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 0.42
[-0.17,-0.02] [-0.42,0.42] [-0.18,-0.02] [-0.17,-0.02] [0.14,0.69]
y(1) 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.90
[0.97,1.00] [0.94,1.00] [0.96,1.00] [0.97,1.00] [0.85,0.94]
(1) 0.62 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.72
[0.69,0.99] [0.79,0.96] [0.73,0.99] [0.74,0.99] [0.61,0.84]
R(1) 0.90 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.94
[0.94,1.00] [0.91,0.98] [0.94,1.00] [0.95,1.00] [0.90,0.97]
y(2) 0.86 0.97 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.81
[0.94,1.00] [0.82,0.99] [0.93,1.00] [0.94,1.00] [0.73,0.89]
(2) 0.56 0.82 0.73 0.83 0.84 0.66
[0.63,0.99] [0.58,0.91] [0.65,0.98] [0.65,0.99] [0.53,0.78]
R(2) 0.76 0.96 0.86 0.95 0.96 0.86
[0.90,1.00] [0.79,0.94] [0.89,1.00] [0.90,1.00] [0.79,0.94]
y(4) 0.59 0.95 0.72 0.95 0.95 0.67
[0.88,1.00] [0.52,0.95] [0.88,1.00] [0.88,1.00] [0.55,0.79]
(4) 0.55 0.79 0.49 0.79 0.79 0.55
[0.56,0.98] [0.25,0.81] [0.58,0.98] [0.57,0.98] [0.41,0.69]
R(4) 0.57 0.92 0.66 0.91 0.92 0.73
[0.81,1.00] [0.50,0.82] [0.80,0.99] [0.81,1.00] [0.59,0.86]
Note: (1): Baseline NK, (2): Hybrid NK (Backward Indexation, Real Rigidities), (3): Imperfect Info. Temporary
vs Permanent Shocks, (4): Imperfect Info., Cogley{Sbordone, (5): Imperfect Info., Noisy Signals. 95% HPDI in
brackets.
47Table 27: HP{ltered Moments (Post 82 period)
Data (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
y 1.00 0.96 1.72 0.99 1.00 0.95
[0.81,1.13] [1.14,2.32] [0.83,1.17] [0.84,1.17] [0.81,1.10]
 0.18 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.23 0.24
[0.20,0.27] [0.33,0.53] [0.19,0.26] [0.20,0.27] [0.20,0.27]
R 0.29 0.29 0.52 0.29 0.29 0.31
[0.25,0.33] [0.39,0.65] [0.25,0.34] [0.25,0.34] [0.26,0.36]
(;y) 0.13 0.05 0.38 0.07 0.10 0.24
[-0.03,0.15] [0.02,0.65] [-0.03,0.16] [0.02,0.20] [0.14,0.35]
(R;y) 0.58 -0.11 -0.04 -0.16 -0.10 0.26
[-0.21,-0.03] [-0.38,0.27] [-0.27,-0.05] [-0.20,-0.02] [0.05,0.47]
y(1) 0.84 0.71 0.90 0.68 0.70 0.67
[0.69,0.72] [0.85,0.94] [0.64,0.72] [0.69,0.72] [0.64,0.70]
(1) 0.13 0.21 0.73 0.29 0.34 0.34
[0.11,0.32] [0.67,0.81] [0.17,0.41] [0.23,0.44] [0.23,0.45]
R(1) 0.84 0.67 0.86 0.67 0.72 0.75
[0.61,0.72] [0.81,0.91] [0.61,0.73] [0.67,0.77] [0.69,0.81]
y(2) 0.65 0.47 0.70 0.44 0.47 0.42
[0.45,0.48] [0.61,0.79] [0.40,0.48] [0.45,0.48] [0.37,0.46]
(2) 0.08 0.08 0.47 0.12 0.13 0.20
[0.03,0.14] [0.37,0.61] [0.05,0.19] [0.06,0.20] [0.14,0.28]
R(2) 0.55 0.44 0.66 0.44 0.48 0.50
[0.39,0.48] [0.58,0.75] [0.39,0.49] [0.44,0.52] [0.44,0.57]
y(4) 0.18 0.12 0.25 0.11 0.12 0.06
[0.11,0.12] [0.11,0.40] [0.09,0.12] [0.11,0.12] [0.02,0.10]
(4) 0.27 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.01
[-0.04,0.00] [-0.12,0.19] [-0.04,0.01] [-0.06,-0.01] [-0.01,0.04]
R(4) 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.11
[0.09,0.12] [0.09,0.38] [0.08,0.13] [0.10,0.14] [0.06,0.15]
Note: (1): Baseline NK, (2): Hybrid NK (Backward Indexation, Real Rigidities), (3): Imperfect Info. Temporary
vs Permanent Shocks, (4): Imperfect Info., Cogley{Sbordone, (5): Imperfect Info., Noisy Signals. 95% HPDI in
brackets.
48C.1 Figures, Post 1982 period



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Let the state of the economy be represented by two vectors e Xb
t and e X
f
t . The rst one includes
the predetermined (backward looking) state variables, i.e. e Xb
t = ( e Rt 1;e zt;e gt; e "R
t )0, whereas the
second one consists of the forward looking state variables, i.e. e X
f



















Let us denote the signal process by fStg. The measurement equation relates the state of the










Finally u and v are assumed to be normally distributed covariance matrices uu and vv re-
spectively and E(uv0) = 0.
Xt+ijt = E(Xt+ijIt) for i > 0 and where It denotes the information set available to the agents
at the beginning of period t. The information set available to the agents consists of i) the
structure of the model and ii) the history of the observable signals they are given in each period:
It = fSt j;j > 0;M0;M1;M2;C;uu;vvg
The information structure of the agents is described fully by the specication of the signals.
D.1 Solving the system











































From which we get
Xb





t+1jt = (Wfb + WffG)Xb
tjt = WfXb
tjt (24)











































































where, Wc =  M 1

















with F0 =  Wc
ff
 1Wc
fb and F1 = G   F0.

















with M0 = Wc
bb + Wc











where S0 = Cb + CfF0 and S1 = CfF1
56D.2 Filtering
Since our solution involves terms in Xb
tjt, we would like to compute this quantity. However, the
only information we can exploit is a signal St that was described previously. We therefore use
a Kalman lter approach to compute the optimal prediction of Xb
tjt.
In order to recover the Kalman lter, it is a good idea to think in terms of expectation errors.






e St = St   Stjt 1
Note that since St depends on Xb
tjt, only the signal relying on e St = St   S1Xb
tjt can be used to
infer anything on Xb
tjt. Therefore, the policy maker revises its expectations using a linear rule
depending on e Se
t = St   S1Xb
tjt. The ltering equation then writes
Xb
tjt = Xb
tjt 1 + K(e Se
t   e Se
tjt 1) = Xb
tjt 1 + K(S0 e Xb
t + vt)
where K is the lter gain matrix, that we would like to compute.
The rst thing we have to do is to rewrite the system in terms of state{space representation.
Since Stjt 1 = (S0 + S1)Xb
tjt 1, we have





= S0 e Xb
t + S1K(S0 e Xb
t + vt) + vt
= S? e Xb
t + t
where S? = (I + S1K)S0 and t = (I + S1K)vt.














= M0 e Xb
t   M0K(S0 e Xb
t + vt) + M2ut+1
= M? e Xb
t + !t+1
where M? = M0(I   KS0) and !t+1 = M2ut+1   M0Kvt.
We therefore end{up with the following state{space representation
e Xb
t+1 = M? e Xb
t + !t+1 (27)
e St = S? e Xb
t + t (28)
57For which the Kalman lter is given by
e Xb
tjt = e Xb
tjt 1 + PS?0(S?PS?0 + ) 1(S? e Xb
t + t)
But since e Xb
tjt is an expectation error, it is not correlated with the information set in t 1, such
that e Xb
tjt 1 = 0. The prediction formula for e Xb
tjt therefore reduces to
e Xb
tjt = PS?0(S?PS?0 + ) 1(S? e Xb
t + t) (29)
where P solves
P = M?PM?0 + !!
and  = (I + S1K)vv(I + S1K)0 and !! = M0KvvK0M00 + M2uuM20
Note however that the above solution is obtained for a given K matrix that remains to be
computed. We can do that by using the basic equation of the Kalman lter:
Xb
tjt = Xb
tjt 1 + K(e Se
t   e Se
tjt 1)
= Xb
tjt 1 + K(St   S1Xb
tjt   (Stjt 1   S1Xb
tjt 1))
= Xb






tjt = (I + KS1) 1(Xb
tjt 1 + K(St   S0Xb
tjt 1))
= (I + KS1) 1(Xb
tjt 1 + KS1Xb
tjt 1   KS1Xb
tjt 1 + K(St   S0Xb
tjt 1))
= (I + KS1) 1(I + KS1)Xb
tjt 1 + (I + KS1) 1K(St   (S0 + S1)Xb
tjt 1))
= Xb
tjt 1 + (I + KS1) 1K e St
= Xb
tjt 1 + K(I + S1K) 1e St
= Xb
tjt 1 + K(I + S1K) 1(S? e Xb
t + t)
where we made use of the identity (I +KS1) 1K  K(I +S1K) 1. Hence, identifying to (29),
we have
K(I + S1K) 1 = PS?0(S?PS?0 + ) 1









+ vv)(I + S1K)0
i 1
K(I + S1K) 1 = PS00
(I + S1K)0(I + S1K)0 1(S0PS00






P = M?PM?0 + !!
Remembering that M? = M0(I + KS0) and !! = M0KvvK0M00 + M2uuM20, we have
P = M0(I   KS0)P

M0(I   KS0)
0 + M0KvvK0M00 + M2uuM20
= M0
h
(I   KS0)P(I   S00K0) + KvvK0
i
M00 + M2uuM20
Plugging the denition of K in the latter equation, we obtain
P = M0
h
P   PS00(S0PS00 + vv) 1S0P
i
M00 + M2uuM20 (31)
D.3 Summary



















tjt 1) + vt) (35)
Xb
t+1jt = (M0 + M1)Xb
tjt (36)
which fully describe the dynamics of our economy.






= (M0 + M1)Xb
tjt + K(S0(M0Xb
t + M1Xb
tjt + M2ut+1   (M0 + M1)Xb
tjt) + vt+1)
= KS0M0Xb
t + ((I   KS0)M0 + M1)Xb























KS0M0 ((I   KS0)M0 + M1)

and Me =

M2 0
KS0M2 K

and
X
f
t = Mf

Xb
t
Xb
tjt

where
Mf =
 
F0 F1 
59